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Giandomenico Majone
Public policymaking and its analysis 
at National and European Levels
Abstract
The author describes the specific features of public policy process at the European Union 
level and its differences related to policy-making at national level. He underlines, among 
other things that the policy agenda in the European Union is being shaped differently. 
At the national level the agenda is under greater influence of politicians who are closely 
interconnected with voters. At the European Union level the technocratic (not directly 
elected) European Commission has a monopoly of legislative initiative. Furthermore, at 
the European level feasibility studies – as an element of the pre-decision stage in public 
policy-making – tend to be ignored. In nation-states we can see such analyses as a result 
of competition taking place between those who rule and their political opposition. At 
the European Union level it is not the case. The author points out that these mecha-
nisms would have been beneficial for the EU member states. They would have halted 
the implementation of decisions which ran the excessive risk. He has also in mind the 
decision related to the introduction of the monetary union. In his opinion, this decision 
was made without a proper feasibility analysis (costs and profits). Basically, the decision 
on a common currency was made on political rather than substantive grounds. A large 
number of experts were against the idea as they perceived serious risks involved in it. 
The supporters of greater European integration ignored the fact that the monetary union 
deprived nation-states of many factors that affected the economic development in a posi-
tive way. The point is that they were under influence of “total optimism” expecting only 
good results of the monetary union. The mechanisms of crisis management, including exit 
scenario from the monetary union, or methods of supporting those members who need 
financial aid, have not been even created. Furthermore, the evaluation of the monetary 
union was not properly carried out as it was based on the assessment of the process (for 
example, smooth introduction of euro notes and coins or phasing out of the national 
currencies in 2002) and not of its results.
Keywords: public policy, policy analysis, policy evaluation, monetary union, European 
integration.
10 Giandomenico Majone
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
Tworzenie i analiza polityki publicznej na szczeblu  
narodowym i europejskim
Streszczenie
Autor wskazuje na specyfikę sposobu tworzenia polityki publicznej na poziomie Unii 
Europejskiej w porównaniu ze sposobem tworzenia polityki na poziomie krajowym. 
Podkreśla m.in. to, że w UE inaczej kształtowana jest agenda polityki. Na poziomie 
krajowym w większym stopniu kształtują ją politycy pozostający w bliskiej relacji z wy-
borcami. Na poziomie europejskim kształtuje ją Komisja Europejska, która posiada 
wyłączne prawo do inicjatywy ustawodawczej w UE i jest instytucją technokratyczną 
(nie pochodzi z bezpośrednich wyborów).
Ponadto na poziomie europejskim analiza wykonalności polityki publicznej bywa igno-
rowana (na etapie przed decyzyjnym). W państwach narodowych takie analizy są reali-
zowane z uwagi na istnienie mechanizmów konkurencji między rządzącymi i opozycją. 
W strukturach UE nie ma takich mechanizmów. Jednocześnie autor wskazuje, że taka 
analiza mogłaby zapewnić Unii Europejskiej korzyści. Blokowałaby wprowadzanie w życie 
decyzji obarczonych nadmiernym ryzykiem. Ma tu na myśli również decyzję o wprowa-
dzeniu unii monetarnej. Jego zdaniem, zapadła ona bez właściwej analizy wykonalności 
takiego przedsięwzięcia.
Decyzję o wprowadzeniu wspólnej waluty podjęto z uwagi na czynniki polityczne, a nie 
merytoryczne. Znaczna część ekspertów była przeciwna temu, wskazując na istotne 
ryzyko. Zwolennicy daleko posuniętej integracji gospodarczej w UE nie uwzględnili 
faktu, że integracja monetarna pozbawia państwa czynników, które mają pozytywny 
wpływ na rozwój gospodarczy. Jednak w gronach politycznych panował klimat „totalnego 
optymizmu” w odniesieniu do rezultatów unii monetarnej. Nie uwzględniano nawet sce-
nariusza negatywnego. Nie stworzono mechanizmów zarządzania kryzysowego, w tym 
mechanizmów opuszczenia unii, sposobów wsparcia członków, którzy nie radzą sobie 
z członkostwem. Ponadto w niewłaściwy sposób dokonywano ewaluacji skutków unii 
monetarnej. Robiono to na podstawie osiągnięć technicznych (oceniano proces, a nie 
jego rezultat), jak sprawne wprowadzenie banknotów i monet euro, a także wycofanie 
walut krajowych w roku 2002.
Słowa kluczowe: polityka publiczna, analiza polityki publicznej, ewaluacja, unia monetarna, 
integracja europejska.
As globalization of competition has intensified, some have begun to argue a di-
minished role for nations. Instead, internationalization and the removal of protec-
tion and other distortions to competition arguably make nations, if anything, more 
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important. National differences in character and culture, far from being threatened 
by global competition, prove integral to success in it.
M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, p. 30.
Efforts at European unification are raising questions about whether the influence 
of nations on competition will diminish. Instead, freer trade will arguably make them 
more important.
M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, p. 158.
Policymaking and policy analysis in a democracy: 
the search for feasibility
According to the 1999 White Paper of the British government on Modernising 
Government “policy making is the process by which governments translate their 
political vision into programmes and actions to deliver “outcomes” – desired changes 
in the real world”. This definition greatly simplifies a very complex process, but even 
more complex definitions give no idea of how to deal, conceptually or in practice, 
with the whole sequence of steps through which policy is made, implemented, 
adapted, or terminated.
To provide the tools to understand and steer the entire process is the goal, or at 
least the ambition, of the (relatively) new academic field known as policy analysis. 
While law, economics, sociology and other traditional disciplines concentrate on 
particular stages or aspects of the policymaking process, policy analysis is primar-
ily concerned with how its different parts fit together, and how they interact with 
the external environment. To give at least an intuitive idea of this general approach 
to public policy, one can start by distinguishing the two stages of a pre-and post-
decision. Problem definition, agenda setting and feasibility analysis are the main 
components of the first stage of the process; the post-decision phase is characterized 
by implementation, evaluation, and accountability.
The essence of the decision itself, as President John F. Kennedy once observed, 
remains impenetrable to the observer, often to the decision maker himself. This is 
certainly the case of a single decision maker who assumes full responsibility for the 
final outcome, such as the American president; but even in the case of collective 
decisions – as in a cabinet system or, even more, in the complex decision-making 
system of the European Union – not even all the direct participants are in a position 
to know what the actual bargains were which made the final decision possible. For 
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example, German and French views of the meaning and purpose of the decision 
to move to the European monetary union, were, and continue to be, vastly different1.
The two phases of a pre- and post-decision are closely interconnected, and 
precisely these interconnections are mostly ignored by more traditional approaches 
to policymaking. Take, for example, a feasibility analysis – arguably the most impor-
tant element of the pre-decision stage. Economists will consider the economic, and 
perhaps also the technological, constraints facing the policymaker(s); similarly the 
legal experts will call attention to potential or actual constitutional, administrative-
law, or regulatory problems.
But of course there are many other constraints about which policymakers are, 
or should be, concerned: political, institutional, organizational, social, cultural, etc. 
Regardless of their nature, constraints always limit the freedom of choice of the poli-
cymaker, and this implicit cost must always enter the calculations of the policymaker 
and his or her advisors. As I wrote some years ago, such pervasive limitations on the 
powers of policymakers explain why optimization – which traditionally has been 
the main concern of economists – is such an elusive goal in the public sector, where 
suboptimal solutions will usually be the only feasible ones. A formal proof of this 
conclusion is provided by the second-best theorem of welfare economics.
This theorem states that the first-order conditions for an optimum are not, 
in general, valid policy criteria in a situation where, because of some constraints 
added to the usual budgetary and technical limitations, the conditions cannot be 
all simultaneously satisfied. But if sub-optimal (“second-best”) solutions are the 
only feasible ones, then it follows that feasibility, rather than optimality, should be 
the main concern of both policymakers and policy analysts; and also that political 
and institutional constraints should be taken as seriously as technical, economic, or 
legal limitations2.
A fully fledged feasibility analysis should consider at least two other issues. First, 
many constraints can often be removed, or made no longer binding, but at a cost; and, 
second, today’s constraints are not necessarily tomorrow’s constraints. Only some 
basic laws of nature – say, the law of gravity – are unconditionally binding; most eco-
nomic, legal, institutional and cultural constraints could be relaxed – given sufficient 
time and resources. Thus, a good part of feasibility analysis consists in assessing the 
costs and the benefits of relaxing certain important constraints. A rational decision 
1 G. Majone, Europe As The Would-Be World Power: The EU At Fifty, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009.
2 G. Majone, Evidence, Argument & Persuasion In The Policy Process, New Haven, CT Yale University 
Press 1989, pp. 75–81, pp. 147–155 of the expanded Polish edition, Warsaw 2004.
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to proceed rebus sic stantibus, i.e., under the given conditions, should be justified by 
such a cost-benefit calculus, however intuitive.
On the other hand, constraints change over time: some disappear while new 
ones emerge; some are no longer binding limits to what can be done, but only minor 
nuisances; factors previously ignored turn out to restrict quite significantly the range 
of possible choices. This dynamic aspect of feasibility has far-reaching implications, 
which are often ignored. I tried to work out some of these implications in a paper 
titled “Implementation as Evolution” which I published with Aaron Wildavsky in 1979.
I drew part of the inspiration from a passage in Cardinal Newman’s An Essay 
in the Development of Christian Doctrine (originally published in 1845) in which this 
eminent theologian writes of ideas developing over time “through a combination of 
the most diversified aspects, with the suggestions and corrections of many minds, 
and the illustrations of many trials”.
This struck me as a good characterization of how policy ideas develop, and led 
me to view policies as being “continuously transformed by implementing actions 
that simultaneously alter resources and constraints”. In other words, implementation 
shapes policy: “the discovery that some constraints are no longer binding can suggest 
to implementers possibilities that the original planners did not envisage or desire… 
How well policies respond to opportunities, how well they facilitate adaptation and 
error correction, are qualities insufficiently discussed”. The key point is that “we 
choose after the act as well as before”3.
Thus, while feasibility considerations are a key element of what I have called a pre-
decision analysis, they continue to remain important after the initial policy decision 
has been taken. This concern with the entire process of making, implementing, and 
adapting policy is, to repeat, what distinguishes policy analysis from the economic, 
legal or other narrower approaches to the theory and practice of public policy.
Concern with agenda setting is another feature setting a policy analysis apart 
from more specialized views of the policy process. The starting point here is the ob-
servation that objective conditions are seldom so compelling or unambiguous that 
they determine the policy agenda. The student of agenda setting attempts to trace 
the causal paths along which public issues travel, and to predict which issues may 
eventually reach the decision agenda.
A policy idea that fails to meet a preliminary feasibility criterion is unlikely to be 
considered as a serious contender for place on the public agenda, at least in democra-
cies with a well-developed government-opposition dialectic; in a system where this 
dialectic is absent, as in the European Union (EU), the situation is quite different, 
3 G. Majone, A. Wildavsky, Implementation as Evolution, 1979, p. 186.
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as will be seen in the following pages (in a later section I shall consider the most 
important elements of a post-decision analysis: policy evaluation and accountability).
To understand the process of agenda setting, it is important to know whether 
some individual or institution is in a position to control the agenda. In the United 
States, for example, each congressional committee has jurisdiction over a specific 
subset of policy issues. Within their jurisdiction, committees possess the monopoly 
right to bring alternatives to the status quo up for a vote before the legislature. The 
agenda power held by the committee members implies that successful coalitions, on 
a given issue, must include the members of the relevant committee: without these 
members the bill will not reach the floor for a vote. Thus committee veto power 
means that, from among the set of public policies that command a majority against 
the status quo, only those that make the committee better off are possible.
In the EU it is the unelected European Commission that has a monopoly of policy 
initiation. No national government can induce the Commission to make a specific 
proposal change the status quo, unless that proposal also makes the Commission 
better off. It is important to understand clearly what is implied by the Commission’s 
monopoly of agenda setting4.
The most immediate implication is that it is up to the Commission to decide 
whether the EU should act and, if so, in what legal form, and what content and 
implementing procedures should be followed. Also, the Commission can amend 
its proposal at any time while it is under discussion in the Council of Ministers, 
but the Council can amend the proposal only by unanimity. The importance of the 
Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiative is demonstrated by the fact that the 
European Parliament has never claimed the right to initiate legislation. At any rate, 
it is clear that in both cases – the US Congress and the EU – agenda control turns 
out to be crucial for understanding policy outputs.
These preliminary remarks serve two main purposes. First, to point out that 
there are crucially important aspects of public policymaking that are not adequately 
covered by specialized approaches and methodologies, whether economic, legal, or 
strictly political. Only an approach which at least attempts to address all the dimen-
sions of policymaking – with the assistance of specialized disciplines where necessary 
– can aspire to give a realistic view of policymaking. Both in Europe and in America, 
a policy analysis has been developed almost exclusively in the context of national or 
sub-national politics and policy.
4 G. Majone, Europe As The Would-Be World Power: The EU At Fifty, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009, pp. 160–161.
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Hence the second purpose of this introduction is to alert the reader to the fact that 
terms like “policy making” and “policy analysis” have rather different meanings when 
applied to the supranational (European) level. For example, the notion of feasibility, 
so crucially important at the national level, has often been completely overlooked, 
nor only by European policymakers, but also by legal scholars and political scientists 
specializing in European affairs.
This fact already suggests that the political culture prevailing in Brussels must 
differ significantly from the political culture of contemporary democracies. Again, 
we know that most EU policies are implemented by the national authorities. But if 
it is true that implementation shapes policy, then it follows that there is no single, 
clearly defined, European policy, but as many “European” policies as there are mem-
ber states of the EU implementing broad supranational objectives. This observation 
can be generalized: many European institutions and policies bear the same names 
as national institutions/policies which in fact operate according to very different 
principles and in very different contexts. The most obvious example: the European 
Parliament cannot initiate legislation, like any self-respecting national legislature.
Another important example: the European Central Bank often has been described 
as an institution designed according to the blueprint of the old (pre-monetary union) 
Bundesbank. In a perceptive article published in Spiegel On Line of 15 February 2012, 
Wolfgang Muenchau rejects what may be called the Clausewitzian view of the ECB as 
a continuation of the old Bundesbank by other means. Muenchau, an Associate Editor 
and well-known columnist of the Financial Times, argues that the crisis of the euro 
zone has definitely shown that the ECB is not a clone of the German central bank.
In fact, it should have been clear all along that the Bundesbank model could 
not have been replicated at the European level, for at least three reasons. First, the 
broad domestic consensus concerning the importance of price stability, budgetary 
discipline and international competitiveness does not exist in other countries of the 
euro zone having greatly different histories and political cultures.
The second reason is the economic, social, and political homogeneity of Ger-
many, which contrasts with the great heterogeneity of the euro zone. The third, and 
according to Muenchau most important, difference between the ECB and the old 
Bundesbank is that the German economy, for all its strength, is a fairly small relative 
to the world economy. This means that the old Bundesbank did not have to worry 
too much about the impact of its decisions outside Germany. By contrast, the ECB 
cannot overlook the impact of its policies on the world economy because of the size 
of the euro zone. A clear indication of the international significance of the euro 
crisis, I would add, is the concern of the president of the United States, as well as of 
the leaders of China and of the other BRIC countries, about the risk of sovereign 
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defaults in the euro zone. Thus, none of the three conditions which made it possible 
for the Bundesbank to operate successfully at the national level, are satisfied at the 
European level.
But the ECB is also different from the United States Federal Reserve which, 
according to its statute, must pursue not one but two objectives: price stability and 
full employment. Thus in early 2011, the ECB raised the interest rate because of the 
risk of higher inflation, while the Fed was easing monetary policy because of a rise 
in unemployment. The main difference between the two institutions, however, is that 
the governor of the Fed has a political counterpart in the Secretary of the Treasury, 
while the political counterparts of the president of the ECB are 17 heads of state or 
government, 17 finance ministers, the president of the European Commission, and 
the Commissioner responsible for economic and monetary affairs. It follows that the 
president of the ECB will never be able to play a role with respect to the multi-headed 
governance of the euro zone comparable to that of the governor of the Federal Reserve 
vis-à-vis the federal government of the United States. Muenchau concludes that as 
an institutional “hermaphrodite” (“Zwitter”) the ECB can only play a secondary role 
in the current crisis.
In sum, using the same labels for European and national institutions and poli-
cies can be quite misleading – a point whose importance this paper will, hopefully, 
demonstrate.
In the next section I start by discussing the political culture developed in more 
than half a century of European integration; I argue that this peculiar political cul-
ture explains, among other things, the reluctance of European leaders to discuss 
the feasibility of their projects and even to consider the possibility of policy failure.
A political culture of total optimism
When the euro was introduced, an American political economist wrote: “Pru-
dence might have counselled that the European Union take certain steps well before 
the creation of the euro area”5. He was referring to what has been called the “dark 
secret” of monetary union: the fact that the relevant article of the Maastricht Treaty 
is so ambiguous that it is not clear who is actually responsible for the exchange rate 
of the euro.
5 C. R. Henning, U. S.-EU Relations after the Inception of the Monetary Union: Cooperation or Rivalry?, 
in Id. and Padoan, P. C. Transatlantic Perspectives on the Euro, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
D. C. 2000, p. 41.
17Public policymaking and its analysis at National and European Levels
nr 2(6)2015
Again, even Wim Duisenberg – who as (first) president of the ECB should have 
been better informed about the financial conditions of would-be members of the 
monetary union--was absolutely delighted when, in January 2001, Greece adopted 
the euro. Like many other Euro-enthusiasts the Dutch banker was convinced that 
for the sake of European integration it was important to have as many countries as 
possible in the monetary union, including Greece. These are only few examples of 
the unconcerned attitude which until recently prevailed among EU leaders-not just 
in monetary policy but in all areas of European competence.
Henning, like the majority of American experts, had counselled prudence, but 
the truth is that prudential reasoning is foreign to the philosophy of fait accompli, 
which goes back to the beginnings of European integration. This philosophy as-
sumes that the success of a decision is determined by the decision makers themselves 
rather than by those who will be affected by the decision; hence, the possibility of 
failure is excluded a priory. For example, there is no indication that the feasibility of 
the goal of the 1970 Werner Plan – to achieve monetary union by 1980 – was ever 
 seriously considered.
Again, the Single European Market was supposed to be achieved by 1992. In fact, 
we are more distant from the goal today than we were in the 1990 s, mainly because 
the services sector, which keeps growing, is still largely regulated at the national level. 
Over the years, the strategy of “fait accompli” has generated the political culture 
– the values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes – prevailing in Brussels and in several 
national capitals, when dealing with European affairs.
Fait accompli – the accomplished fact which makes opposition and argument 
useless – is the foundation of the so-called Monnet method. The best characterization 
of this method has been provided by Pascal Lamy, former European Commissioner 
and erstwhile lieutenant of Commission President Jacques Delors: “Europe was built 
in a St. Simonian [i.e., technocratic] way from the beginning, this was Monnet’s ap-
proach: The people weren’t ready to agree to integration, so you had to get on without 
telling them too much about what was happening”.
However, Lamy was honest enough to add: “Now St. Simonianism is finished. It 
can’t work when you have to face democratic opinion”6. The culture of total optimism 
emerged in the 1960 s and early 1970 s – the age of “permissive consensus”, when the 
integration project was taken for granted by European publics, as part of the political 
landscape, and did not seem to require any kind of accountability by results.
This optimistic attitude was facilitated by the fact that most European policies 
were too remote from the daily problems of the people to seriously concern public 
6 Cited in G. Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration, Polity Press, London 1995, p. 194.
18 Giandomenico Majone
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
opinion. The total optimism of EU leaders is supported by two different groups. On 
the one hand, federalists derive confidence in the final success of their cause from 
the conviction that the nation state is no longer viable, at least in Europe. Therefore, 
sooner or later European citizens will acknowledge the necessity of political union, 
and will also understand why in certain situations it is necessary to accept risks that 
would be considered unacceptable under different circumstances. But also EU lead-
ers who are not in favour of full political union find it convenient to display total 
optimism concerning the outcomes of the collective decisions taken in Brussels.
This is because they have a vested interest in the preservation of a system that 
allows them to take unpopular measures in camera, rather than in a direct confronta-
tion with the opposition parties at home. Moreover, most decisions taken in Brussels 
must satisfy different, even conflicting, interests. The decision to proceed with the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), for example, was supported by leaders who 
saw EMU as a necessary step towards political union; by governments that wished 
to terminate the “tyranny of the German Mark”; and by leaders who correctly assumed 
that membership in the euro zone would immediately improve the credit rating of 
their countries, allowing them to borrow at significantly lower rates of interest.
When the same decision must satisfy so many different interests, the atten-
tion of the bargainers tends to be focused on immediate benefits rather than on 
long-term consequences. A political culture of total optimism could hardly survive 
in the conflictive politics of modern mass democracies, but it did take roots at the 
supranational level, where it actually could facilitate decision-making. The fact that 
long-term consequences are heavily discounted explains, not only the absence of 
contingency plans and of any other instrument of crisis management, but also the 
willingness of European leaders to increase the risk of future failure for the sake of 
immediate advantages.
It is indeed hard to find a better example of the willingness of EU leaders to com-
promise their collective credibility than the decision to proceed with the monetary 
union before there was any agreement on the political union, and leaving a number 
of technical and institutional problems unresolved. Nor can one find, in the entire 
history of European integration, a better illustration of the complete disregard, 
not only of expert opinion, but also of such basic principles of crisis management 
as the timely preparation of contingency plans, and careful attention to signs that 
may foretell a crisis. The lax application of the convergence criteria of the Maastricht 
Treaty, and of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, introduced in 1996 at Ger-
many’s request, are other examples of the same tendency to increase the risks of an 
already risky project. Similar, if less striking, examples can be easily found in most 
other policy areas.
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Monetary union and the paradox of policy harmonization
Harmonization of the laws and policies of the member states is one of the three 
legal techniques which the Treaty of Rome (Article 100) made available to the Eu-
ropean Commission for establishing and maintaining a common European market 
– the other two techniques being liberalization and the control of anti-competitive 
behaviour. The legal literature distinguishes three main modes of harmonization: 
total, optional, and minimum harmonization. From the early 1960s to the early 
1970s the Commission’s approach was characterized by a distinct preference for total 
harmonization – detailed measures designed to regulate exhaustively the problems 
in question, to the exclusion of previously existing national policies. Under total 
harmonization once European rules have been put in place, a member state’s capacity 
to apply different rules is excluded.
The European Court of Justice initially supported this exclusive Community 
competence, judging it to be necessary to the construction of the common market 
and, more generally, to the autonomy of the Community system. Already by the 
mid-1970s, however, the limits of total harmonization had become visible. The idea 
of a common market structured by one body of uniform European rules had to be 
given up once it was realized that total harmonization confers on the Community 
an exclusive competence which it is ill-equipped to discharge. The emphasis shifted 
from total to optional and minimum harmonization. Optional harmonization aims 
to guarantee the free movement of goods, while permitting the member states to retain 
their traditional forms of regulation for goods produced for the domestic market. 
Under minimum harmonization, the national governments must secure the level of 
regulation set out in a directive but are permitted to set higher standards, provided 
that the stricter national rules do not violate Community law.
Concerns about what already in the 1970 s some member states considered 
excessive centralization became more intense after the Single European Act (SEA) 
introduced qualified majority voting for harmonization measures having the internal 
market as their object. Even before the SEA was ratified, in 1986, Alan Dashwood, 
a noted British expert in European law, had observed that in the Economic Commu-
nity harmonization tended to be pursued not so much to resolve concrete problems 
encountered in the course of constructing the common market as to drive forward the 
general process of integration. This, he pointed out, was bound to affect the judgment 
of the Commission, inclining it towards maximum exercise of the powers available 
under Article 100 of the EC Treaty, and towards solutions involving a high degree 
of uniformity between national laws. In fact, the shifts from total to less stringent 
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forms of harmonization were “the inevitable adjustments to the notion of uniformity 
demanded by a Community structure that is supporting an ever-increasing number 
of Member States and an ever-increasing range of functions”7.
Since these lines were written the number of member states has almost doubled, 
the range of EU competences has greatly expanded, and socioeconomic diversity 
among the member states has increased exponentially. In spite of all these changes, 
the boldest experiment in total harmonization was launched on 1 January 1999, when 
the final stage of monetary union entered into force with the irrevocable fixing of 
the exchange rates of the currencies of 11 (soon to become 12, and eventually 17) 
member states, and the pre-emption of national action in the monetary area. What 
is most striking about this rather paradoxical return to total harmonization is the 
contradiction between the centralization of monetary policy and the mutation of 
the fairly homogeneous EU-15 into a highly heterogeneous bloc of 27 states – a con-
tradiction which tends to reduce the benefits of a common monetary policy. What 
the American economists Eichengreen and Frieden pointed out already in 1995 is 
even truer today:
Given the risks and uncertainties that pervade the process [of monetary integra-
tion] there would have to be a clear margin of benefits over costs for economic con-
siderations, narrowly defined, to provide a justification for such a radical departure 
in policy. The absence of such a margin implies that the momentum for monetary 
union must therefore derive from other, primarily political factors8.
Unfortunately, the political benefits of the monetary union have been even less 
clear than the economic ones. This is particularly true in the case of Germany. Ger-
man leaders worked hard to convince their voters that the sacrifice of the beloved 
D–Mark was justified by the prospect of a decisive advance towards political union. 
In fact, the introduction of the common currency has hardly increased the credibility 
of the commitment of Germany’s partners to political union.
In Germany itself popular support for the political integration of Europe has 
significantly decreased in recent years. After the reunification of the country, the 
disappearance of the Soviet menace, and a fading memory of the horrors of World 
War II, Germany is no longer so dependent on the political support of its European 
partners. It has even been argued – in particular by Wolfgang Muenchau writing 
in Spiegel On Line of 26 September 2012 – that a united and economically strong 
Germany sees itself less as a member of the EU than as an autonomous, medium-size 
7 S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, p. 148.
8 J. Eichengreen, J. A. Frieden, op.cit., p. 274.
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power that can deal directly with Americans, Chinese, and Russians, without wor-
rying too much about its EU partners.
Early warnings
In 2009 EU leaders were surprised and shocked by the first major crisis of the 
common currency – even though they had been warned about the risks of the 
monetary union since the early 1990 s, see below. Shocked surprise is the impres-
sion one gathers from the evident absence of contingency plans, the overreaction of 
some leaders, the abrupt and unexplained changes of attitude – for example, about 
the proper roles of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) in the crisis, or about the stringency of the “no-bailout” clause 
of the Maastricht Treaty. The finance minister of Germany’s Christian-Democratic 
and Social-Democratic coalition government was one of the first European leaders 
to speak about the unspeakable. At an event organized by his Social-Democratic 
party in Duesseldorf on 16 February 2009, Peer Steinbrueck acknowledged that some 
states of the euro zone were in a “very difficult situation”, thus confirming what until 
then only currency market speculators or independent researchers had dared to say.
Then the finance minister went a good deal further: “If one euro zone [member] 
gets into trouble, then collectively we will have to be helpful”. The admission was 
tantamount to a complete reversal of previous official positions. Until then, no politi-
cal leader had been willing to discuss the possibility of aid measures for countries 
in a financial emergency. Now Steinbrueck was conceding that “[t]he euro-region 
treaties don’t foresee any help for insolvent countries, but in reality the other states 
would have to rescue those running into difficulty”. Just one week before the Dues-
seldorf meeting, the same German politician had struck a very different tone, telling 
the other finance ministers of the euro zone that they should not take too seriously 
the “horror scenarios” painted by the media. Also the then president of the ECB, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, had commented reports of the problems some governments 
were starting to have in obtaining fresh capital with the words: “I think these rumours 
are unfounded”.
It would take another year before European institutions and national govern-
ments would admit that the procedures so far in place to coordinate policies and 
re-establish economic equilibrium were insufficient for weathering a serious crisis. 
A report made available by the European Commission in January 2010 noted what 
should have been clear all along, namely that the members of the euro zone differ 
greatly in terms of competitiveness, and also that some countries had taken advantage 
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of the low interest rates following membership in the monetary union, to accumu-
late enormous deficits. EU aid for Greece was still excluded with the argument that 
it would set a dangerous precedent for other countries such as Portugal, Spain, or 
Ireland. Already the following month, however, the heads of government of the EU 
agreed to help Greece, but only in case of absolute necessity, i.e., in case of a serious 
risk of state bankruptcy.
In March, 2010, the German chancellor went so far as to suggest that the member 
states should seriously consider the possibility of expelling from the euro zone a re-
peated rule-breaker. The EU kept insisting that it had a plan to help Greece, should 
the need arise, but lacking details as to what the plan might look like commentators 
were inclined to doubt that assertion. The dearth of details offered by Brussels was 
especially disturbing for Greece. The Greek prime minister tried to put some pressure 
on his European partners by hinting that he was thinking of approaching the IMF for 
assistance. Up to that time, Germany, France and most other member states, as well 
as the European Commission and the ECB, had categorically excluded that the IMF 
could play within the euro zone a role similar to the one it had traditionally played 
in the less developed countries of Asia and Latin America. Eventually, however, it had 
to be admitted that IMF’s financial assistance and technical expertise were needed 
also in the case of serious problems of members of the euro zone.
The confusion of EU leaders confronted by the first serious crisis of the new mon-
etary union was obvious and to some extent understandable in light of the prevailing 
political culture of total optimism. Still, the total absence of contingency plans is par-
ticularly striking in this case because of the many early warnings concerning the risks 
of the monetary union without the political union, and even in the absence of fiscal 
coordination. Thus, Tsoukalis’ widely-used textbook on the economics of European 
integration, published shortly after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, explained 
clearly why the monetary union was a high-risk project with no easy exit options if 
things went wrong. The Greek economist concluded his discussion by pointing out 
that the chosen strategy accorded no place to failure. Ten years later the same econo-
mist noted that the combination of a complete centralization of a monetary policy, 
a highly decentralized fiscal policy, and a disconnected European political system, 
had no precedent in history: “The architects of Maastricht have produced a complex 
design of arguably postmodern inspiration, which seems to defy the law of gravity”9.
A very articulate argument about the political and economic risks of the monetary 
union was made by Martin Feldstein – professor of economics at Harvard, former 
9 L. Tsoukalis, Economic and Monetary Union, in: Policy-Making in the European Union, fourth edi-
tion, eds. H. Wallace, W. Wallace, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 169.
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chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers of the U. S. President, and head of 
the prestigious National Bureau of Economic Research – in an article published in 
The Economist10, even before the Maastricht Treaty came into force. Feldstein begins 
by rejecting the claim, made by a number of EU leaders and especially by the Euro-
pean Commission, that the adoption of a single currency was necessary to perfect 
the single market’s free trade in goods and services.
He points out that it is possible to have all the benefits of free trade without 
a common currency: nobody seriously suggests that Canada, the United States, and 
Mexico, as members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), should 
form a currency union. Even before the formation of NAFTA, trade relations between 
Canada and the U. S. were extremely close – much more so than between any two 
members of the EU – but no monetary union between the two countries has ever 
been seriously considered. The case for linking the monetary union to the creation 
of the single market was based on the notion that eliminating currency fluctuations 
within Europe would increase trade among the members of the EU. However, statis-
tical studies that measured the effect of exchange-rate volatility on trade in Europe 
failed to find any significant impact. Further evidence that currency volatility does 
not inhibit trade, Feldstein added, is the sharp increase in the volume of American 
imports during the 1980 s when the dollar gyrated sharply. Also, the fluctuations of 
the yen relative to the dollar and to European currencies have never been a serious 
barrier to the ability of Japanese firms to increase exports.
Having disposed of this specious argument in support of monetary union, the 
American economist goes on to remind his readers of two conditions that have 
to be met to make it worthwhile for a group of independent countries to adopt 
a single currency: first, the economic shocks that hit the individual countries are 
similar, so that the appropriate monetary policy is generally the same everywhere; 
and, second, labour is highly mobile among countries. It is easy to see that Europe 
is not, in this sense, an optimal currency area. Individual countries tend to suffer 
substantially different shocks because of differences in the mix of the products they 
produce, in the foreign markets to which they sell, and in a host of other relevant 
socioeconomic factors. Labour mobility across Europe, on the other hand, is and 
will remain limited by differences in language and culture and, we may add, in other 
important factors such as the variety of welfare-state regimes.
If Europe is not an optimal currency area, as all experts agree, then it becomes 
crucially important to understand the disadvantages of losing an independent 
national monetary policy. Textbooks on international trade tell us that if demand 
10 M. Feldstein, The case against EMU, “The Economist” 1992, June 13th, pp. 19–22.
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for the products of a country falls, the country will suffer lower employment and 
output unless wages and prices fall as well. In practice, wages and prices adjust only 
slowly, so output and employment suffer. These negative effects can be mitigated 
with devaluation of the national currency or lower domestic interest rates – both 
remedies being impossible, however, if the country is member of a monetary union. 
Why then have most EU member states opted in favour of a monetary union that 
was not necessary to facilitate trade, but likely to add to cyclic instability of incomes 
and employment?
The American economist understood what today everybody admits, namely 
that there political, rather than economic, reasons behind the decision to proceed 
with monetary union. On the one hand, France’s opposition to the leadership role 
of the Bundesbank in Europe and, on the other hand, the hope of pro-integration 
leaders that monetary union would force, sooner or later, political union. Feldstein 
found it quite understandable that those who favoured a politically united Europe 
were prepared to accept the adverse economic effects of monetary union in order 
to achieve a federal union. What he could not understand “are those who advocate 
monetary union but reject any movement towards a federalist political structure for 
Europe. That is a formula for economic costs without any of the supposed political 
benefits”. The reference is, of course, to France.
While Feldstein analysis is particularly detailed, similar warnings have been is-
sued by a number of well-known experts, including. Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Milton Friedman, who went as far as predicting that EMU would not last more than 
fifteen years. Hence the obvious question: how could democratic policymakers launch 
the most ambitious integration project in complete disregard of expert opinion and 
without a contingency plan spelling out what to do in case of a serious crisis? And 
also: how could the same political leaders take on such risks without informing their 
voters, and even against the opposition of a large majority of their voters, as in the 
case of Germany? The most direct answer to both questions is that this is the way 
all important decisions have been taken in the EC/EU for more than half a century.
What was possible in the past, however, is no longer politically acceptable today. 
Even aside from the current crisis, monetary union has fundamentally changed the 
public perception of European integration, inducing much more sober assessments 
of the risks, as well as the benefits, of deep integration. It is hardly necessary to point 
out that no national government would have dared to take such a serious and contro-
versial decision without paying attention to expert opinion, and especially without 
making sure that the majority of their voters would support the decision.
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Wise advice from Poland
Monetary union is considered part of the acquis communautaire – the rights 
and obligations deriving from EU treaties, laws, and regulations, which applicant 
countries must accept at the time of accession. Since monetary union has been pro-
claimed to be part of the acquis, it follows that new member states must join EMU 
once they satisfy the so-called convergence criteria: they are not allowed to opt out 
of monetary union as the UK and Denmark did. However, it seems likely that after 
the crisis of the euro zone, the new member states will reassess more carefully the 
benefits and costs of monetary union, as has been suggested by Slawomir Skrzypek, 
the late president of the National Bank of Poland. Shortly before dying in the Smo-
lensk air crash in which the President of Poland and numerous other personalities 
lost their life, Mr. Skrzypek published an article in the “Financial Times” of 13 April 
2010, titled Poland should not rush to sign up to the euro. In this article, the central 
banker pointed out that in 2010, when Europe was plagued by concerns over exces-
sive public debt in Greece and elsewhere, the Polish economy was projected to grow 
2.7 per cent, accelerating to 3 per cent in 201111. One important reason for this, he 
wrote, is that as a non-member of the euro, Poland has been able to profit from the 
flexibility of the zloty exchange rate in a way that has helped growth and lowered 
the current account deficit without importing inflation… because Poland’s currency 
is not bound by the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, we have been able to adjust the 
value of the zloty in line with domestic requirements.
The decade-long story of peripheral euro members drastically losing competitive-
ness, Mr. Skrzypek added, has been a salutary lesson. The “Greek imbroglio” (as he 
called it) shows that there is no substitute for countries’ own efforts to improve com-
petitiveness, boost fiscal discipline and increase labour and product market flexibility 
– whether or not they are in the euro zone. This banker’s advice to his fellow citizens:
[W]e must temper the wish to adopt the euro with necessary prudence. We should 
not tie ourselves to timetables that may be counterproductive. Solid economic growth 
and sensible policies are possible both within and outside the euro zone. Nations 
in a hurry to join the euro may end up missing their overriding objectives.
A cautious approach similar to the one suggested by Mr. Skrzypek has been 
followed by Sweden since it joined the EU in 1995. This country, not a member of 
the EU when the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, could not obtain a de jure opt out 
from EMU, like the United Kingdom and Denmark. It did however ask, and was 
11 S. Skrzypek, Poland should not rush to sign up to the euro, “Financial Times” 2010, April 13, p. 11.
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granted, a derogation – in practice, a de facto opt out – when it became a member of 
the Union. Swedish leaders have decided that future membership of their country 
in the euro zone shall depend, not on EU prescriptions but on the approval of the 
voters in a popular referendum. Since the beginning of the sovereign-debt crisis 
opinion polls show growing popular opposition to joining monetary union, so that 
the prospect of Swedish membership in EMU keeps receding into the future. Ac-
cording to a survey conducted in July 2010, 61 per cent of the Swedes were against 
joining monetary union; one year earlier the negative votes were only 44 per cent. One 
important reason for the growing opposition to the euro is the fact that Sweden, like 
Poland, has weathered the financial crisis rather well, also thanks to its independent 
monetary policy. The Swedish economy, which is heavily dependent on exports, has 
profited significantly from the weakness of the national currency, the Krone. Recently, 
Sweden had the lowest budget deficit of all EU member states and one of the highest 
rates of economic growth, providing additional evidence in support of Mr. Skrzypek’s 
assessment of the advantages of an independent monetary policy.
It is quite possible that a number of Central and Eastern European countries 
may decide to follow Mr. Skrzypek’s advice and join Sweden in the camp of the de 
facto opt-outs, regardless of the duty of membership in the euro zone imposed on 
them by the acquis communautaire. The Czech Republic and Hungary have already 
linked their acceptance of the common currency to approval by popular referendum 
or by a supermajority in the national parliament..Moreover, in a greatly enlarged 
and increasingly heterogeneous monetary union even the original members of the 
euro zone may conclude that the policies of the ECB no longer correspond to their 
national conditions as well as they did before the enlargement.
This is because the original members will more often than today be outliers, 
in terms of inflation and output, compared to the average that the ECB will have 
to focus on. As a consequence, some older members may realize that the calculus of 
the benefits and costs of monetary union has become less favourable12. In sum, while 
the whole philosophy of monetary union was based on the notion that all member 
states should accept the total harmonization of national monetary policies as a pre-
condition of political union, the paradoxical result seems to be the final breakdown 
of the notion of one set of policies that apply to all member states.
Before concluding this paper, let me return to the discussion of policymaking 
and policy analysis started in section 1. There we considered in some detail the pre-
decision stage, with particular attention to feasibility analysis. Now I intend to examine 
a crucially important part of post-decision analysis, namely policy evaluation. The 
12 P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, pp. 97–101.
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purpose is, again, to see how much the practice of an efficient national government 
differs from the practice and assumptions prevailing at EU level.
Policy evaluation at the national level
If feasibility analysis is arguably the most important element in the ex-ante stage 
of policy analysis, policy evaluation is today considered the major contribution of 
ex-post analysis. Evaluation distinguishes policy analysis from other (economic or 
legal) approaches to the study of public policy, even more clearly than feasibility 
analysis. It is performed by collecting, testing and interpreting information about the 
implementation and outcomes of existing policies and public programmes: whether 
they are accomplishing what was intended, and if not, how they can be improved or 
discontinued. One of the central questions of policy evaluation concerns the kind 
of evaluative criteria that are meaningful, fair, or politically acceptable in a given 
situation. Evaluative criteria vary with the role and position of the evaluator, and 
different evaluators tend to focus their attention on different aspects of the policy-
making process.
General standards or criteria of performance like legality, legitimacy, economy, 
effectiveness, efficiency, or responsiveness to public needs are characteristically 
related to the distinctive roles of judges, politicians, budget officers, public account-
ants, opinion makers, and consumer of public services or their political representa-
tives. This multiplicity of evaluative criteria reflects the complexity of policymaking 
in a pluralistic, democratic society. Debate among advocates of different criteria is 
often useful in reaching agreement, and permits a more sophisticated understanding 
of public policy than is possible from a single perspective. The expression “multiple 
evaluation”, used by professional evaluators, acknowledges the legitimacy of different 
criteria and perspectives, but also suggests the need to reach a level of understand-
ing that is more than the sum of the separate evaluations. Multiple evaluation starts 
with two basic questions: “Evaluation by whom?” and “Evaluation of what?” The 
first question emphasizes the importance of accounting for different evaluative roles, 
while the second question directs our attention to the three basic modes of evaluation 
– inputs evaluation, outcomes evaluation, and process evaluation.
That different criteria are used by people in different roles simply reflects the vari-
ous needs, interests, and concerns of different actors and stakeholders. So long as the 
judgements expressed from the perspective one particular role are not presented or 
misinterpreted as judgements relevant to or speaking for all possible roles, we have 
a healthy state of multiple evaluation. Difficulties begin to arise when the conclusions 
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of an evaluation done for use in a particular role are assumed to be equally relevant 
from the perspective of other roles with different evaluative criteria. Because roles and 
criteria are mismatched, the conclusions of the evaluation are almost inevitably found 
wanting. From the point of view of the present discussion, however, the distinction 
of evaluative modes is more important than the distinction of roles.
Analysts have found it useful to distinguish three general modes f evaluation. In 
the outcome mode, evaluation focuses on the actual results of a particular activity. In 
the input mode, the emphasis is on the resources, skills, and people engaged in that 
activity. Finally, in the process mode, attention shifts to the methods used to trans-
form political, economic, and other inputs into outputs/outcomes. Procedural rules 
that govern participation in and administration of a particular programme are also 
relevant in this context.
I next consider each of these modes separately, but it should always be kept 
in mind that the modes are usually mingled in practical efforts to evaluate policies 
and programmes.
Evaluation by outcomes or results is commonly viewed as the obvious way to as-
sess the value of any purposive activity. Goals and benchmarks are defined, results are 
produced, and the two are compared. In the case of an educational programme, for 
example, one would appraise the difference between pre- and post-tests, or between 
the experimental and the control group, on a number of different criteria. In health 
programmes, the outcomes are changes in incidence and prevalence rates; in man-
power programmes, the outcomes are employment rates, and so on.
This mode of evaluation has strong intuitive appeal, and is about the only one 
in which citizens are interested. However, outcomes evaluation can be successfully 
performed only under rather stringent conditions. For example, it must be possible 
to measure with reasonable precision the level and quality of the desired performance. 
When these conditions cannot be satisfied in practice, other modes of evaluation 
must be used.
Evaluation by inputs focuses on the quantity and quality of the resources available 
to perform a certain task: number and technical quality of the staff, available informa-
tion, level of funding, political support, etc. Unless a definite relationship between 
inputs and outcomes – a well-defined “production function” in the language of the 
economist – can be assumed, input variables are a poor proxy for the effectiveness 
of a given programme. But in some situations, input variables are all the informa-
tion the evaluator has to work with – for example, when the problem is to estimate 
the likely results of a new project or to assess the feasibility of a new programme. 
Moreover, for purposes of control and public accounting, input variables are often 
strategically more important than outputs.
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In some respects, process evaluation is the most subtle and informative mode 
of evaluation – it provides information that input and output measures are almost 
sure to miss. Even in commercial activities where outcomes can be easily quantified, 
prudent managers try to avoid too narrow a focus on results. They do so in the knowl-
edge that the best outcome measures never capture more than a small fraction of the 
total range of performance that is important to the organization. For example, there 
is evidence that compensating teachers on the basis of their output, as measured by 
student test score gains, creates incentives for teachers to concentrate their time on 
students in the middle of the test score distribution, neglecting those at the top who 
would advance well on their own and those at the bottom whose test scores would 
not respond to small additional amounts of teacher time. Also, where the compensa-
tion of teachers depends on the number of students who acquire a set of narrowly 
defined skills (as, for example, under the payment-by-results plans used in England 
in the middle of the 19th century to compensate elementary school teachers), there is 
a tendency to narrow the curriculum to exclude all non-tested subjects – including 
some that are generally perceived to be important but are difficult to test.
As these examples suggest, a careful analysis of the activity to be evaluated is 
essential for the choice of the appropriate method of evaluation, since knowledge of 
the activity provides the best clue to the response that a particular mode of evaluation 
will elicit. Two parameters are crucial for determining the conditions under which 
different modes of evaluation are appropriate: measurability of the outcomes and 
knowledge of the process that generates the outcomes (for more details see Majone 
1989, chapter 8, or chapter 10 of the 2004 Polish edition).
Finally, it should be pointed out that the above discussion of different roles and 
modes of evaluation bears directly on the problem of public accountability. In a de-
mocracy managers and producers of public services are expected to be accountable 
for their performance to those who consume their services and to those who pay for 
them, or to their political representatives. However, accountability cannot be enforced 
without standards of performance, even though there may be disagreement about 
the appropriate standards to be used in a specific situation. For example, account-
ability by results depends on outcomes evaluation, and we saw above that this mode 
of evaluation may involve serious technical and conceptual problems.
Nevertheless, the idea of accountability by results has a strong intuitive appeal 
since it corresponds most closely to way in which voters assess public policies. There-
fore, a democratic government cannot give up the idea of accountability by results, 
regardless of the problems involved in outcomes evaluation: after all, also the other 
modes of evaluation are in various ways problematic. Now, when we move from the 
national to the European level we discover that policy evaluation, if done at all, relies 
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primarily on the input and process modes. In the next section I argue that this may 
be changing because of the euro crisis.
Policy evaluation in the EU: the aftermath  
of the euro crisis
What makes monetary union radically different from previous European poli-
cies is the fact that the problems are now, not only more serious but also much 
more evident than they were in earlier stages of European integration. Thus, the gap 
between the official rhetoric celebrating the economic achievements of European 
integration and the reality of poor economic and productivity growth since the 
1980 s13 went largely unnoticed because most past EU policies were too remote from 
the daily problems of the people to seriously concern public opinion. Moreover, 
the complexity of policymaking at the European level meant that it was difficult for 
ordinary citizens, and sometimes even for the experts, to allocate responsibility for 
unsatisfactory outcomes as between “Brussels” and the national governments. This 
difficulty was aggravated by the fact that for half a century the public statements of 
European political leaders and EU policymakers were based almost exclusively on 
input or process criteria – level of institutionalization, scope of competences, scale 
of operations, size of membership, even volume of legislation – rather than in terms 
of actual results or net benefits for the citizens of the member states.
In the Commission’s White Book on European Governance, for example, the good 
governance principles are largely concerned, not with the ultimate decision/policy 
to be adopted, but with the way in which decisions are reached. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the launch of the single currency in 1999, and the smooth introduction 
of euro notes and coins and phasing out of the national currencies in 2002, were taken 
as conclusive evidence of the success of one of the most risky projects of European 
integration. Two years after the introduction of the common currency a well-known 
monetary expert concluded: “The success of the launch of the euro is not only techni-
cal and economic, it is also and foremost political. The euro is now the most visible 
and practical symbol of the progress towards a political union in Europe”14. At about 
the same time, an American scholar who has written about European integration 
since the 1960s, judged that the introduction of the new common currency had been 
13 G. Majone, Europe As The Would-Be World Power: The EU At Fifty, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009, pp. 81–87.
14 P. De Grauwe, Challenges for Monetary Policy in Euroland, in: Governing EMU, eds. F. Torres, 
A. Verdun, C. Zilioli, H. Zimmerman, European University Institute, Florence 2004, p. 363.
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“a quiet success”. It appears that even distinguished scholars are not aware of the dif-
ferent implications of different evaluation criteria, as discussed previously.
The traditional reliance on process criteria made it possible to present European 
integration as a positive-sum game. In 2001 the Commission could ascribe to Eu-
ropean integration fifty years of stability and economic prosperity, without much 
fear of contestation. After the euro crisis this kind of optimism is no longer possible. 
Now people realize that integration entails costs as well as benefits, and that a positive 
net balance of benefits over costs can no longer be taken for granted. This realistic 
assessment of the consequences of European integration is not only a new, but also 
an ominous development.
This new realism is likely to induce greater popular resistance to future transfers 
of powers to the European level, and a much stronger demand of accountability by 
results – precisely what is foreign to the political culture of total optimism of EU 
leaders and European institutions. Indeed, the basic reason why today public debate 
and hostile public reactions have replaced the permissive consensus of the past 
– when the integration project was seemingly taken for granted by European voters 
as part of the political landscape – is that monetary union put an end to the primacy 
of process over actual results. Unlike most policy decisions taken in Brussels, the 
decisions taken by the ECB are widely advertised, and their consequences – whether 
on home mortgages, on consumer credit, or on the availability of publicly-financed 
services – have a direct impact on the welfare of all inhabitants of the euro zone, 
indeed of the entire EU.
Thus, the most important, if unintended, consequence of monetary union may 
well be the injection of a good dose of realism in the discourse about European 
integration. The implications of this change are vast. A culture of total optimism 
cannot thrive in this new, sober atmosphere, while the integration process becomes 
increasingly politicized. Even before the present crisis, the quantum jump represented 
by monetary union had radically changed the piecemeal approach to integration ad-
vocated by Jean Monnet and by neo-functionalist scholars. Another consequence of 
the politicization of Europe is that political entrepreneurs now have the opportunity 
of differentiating themselves from other parties in terms of European issues, so that 
bargains struck in Brussels may now be contested at the national level.
This particular consequence can already be observed in several member states. 
During the campaign for the Austrian national elections of September 2008, for 
example, both the social-democratic leader and the leaders of the two parties of the 
extreme right appealed to widespread anti-EU feelings in the population to steal 
votes from the pro-EU Volkspartei. New member states such as Hungary and the 
Czech Republic provide other examples of the use and abuse of European issues for 
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party-political purposes. This is an aspect of the politicization of Europe that deserves 
much more systematic analysis than it has received so far.
The national governments between globalization 
and European integration
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007–2008, support for economic (par-
ticularly financial) globalization has declined dramatically, not only in Europe but 
also in the United States. For example, the proportion of respondents in an NBC/Wall 
Street Journal poll saying that globalization had been good for the U. S. economy fell 
dramatically from 42 per cent in June 2007 to 25 per cent in March 2008. The late 
Paul Samuelson, winner of the Nobel Prize for economics, warned that China’s gains 
in globalization may well come at the expense of the United States, while Alan Blinder, 
a former U. S. Federal Reserve vice chairman, worried that international outsourcing 
may cause unprecedented dislocation for the American labour force. In England, 
Martin Wolf, a well-known Financial Times columnist and one of the most articu-
late advocates of globalization, expressed his disappointment with the way financial 
globalization has turned out. None of these experts is against globalization. They do 
not want to reverse globalization, but to create new institutions and compensation 
mechanisms – at home and internationally – that will render globalization more ef-
fective and sustainable. More or less explicitly, they all raise such questions as: Has 
globalization gone too far? Is global governance feasible? Is it desirable?15.
Somewhat similar questions are being raised in Europe today, as a consequence of 
the crisis of monetary union and of the more general crisis of European governance: 
Has European integration gone too far? Is effective European governance feasible? 
Is it desirable? The urgency of such questions is emphasized by what Jean-Claude 
Piris, former head of the Legal Services of the EU Council of Ministers, has called 
the three-fold crisis of European integration: euro crisis, distrust of the citizens, and 
dysfunctional institutions16. In this concluding section I want to discuss the role 
of the national governments in the present critical juncture, in light of the many 
shortcomings of EU governance.
To do this it may be useful to go back to the beginnings of European integra-
tion. According to the federalists of the immediate post-World War II period, it was 
15 D. Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011.
16 J.-C. Piris, It is Time for the Euro Area to Develop Further Closer Cooperation Among its Members, 
“Jean Monnet Working Paper” 2011, no. 5, The NYU Institute on the Park, New York 2011.
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impossible to rebuild a democratic, prosperous and powerful Europe starting with the 
nation states: only a strong federation could solve the great problems of the post-war 
period. The establishment of a federal super-state, the Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli 
argued, would have to precede the political and economic reconstruction of the na-
tional states, the former being the necessary foundation of the latter. The government 
of the future European federation was supposed to be responsible not to the national 
governments but directly to the peoples of the states of the federation. Indeed, since 
the construction of a European federal state should precede the reconstruction of 
the national governments, the federalist ideology would necessarily supersede the 
ideological divisions of the past.
Already by 1946, however, the prediction that Europe’s nation states would all 
collapse, leaving the people free to design their political future on a clean slate, had 
been conclusively refuted. The federalists attributed the responsibility of this failure 
to the interest of the superpowers in preserving the old state structures – except 
in the case of Germany. The truth is that Spinelli – like many other intellectuals, 
then as now, underestimated both the amazing ability of European states to react 
to the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and the depth of popular attachment 
to the nation state. For federalists old and new, the European institutions would 
gradually replace the outdated national institutions. The new “Stability Treaty” is 
the most recent and striking demonstration of the tendency to reduce the autonomy 
of national governments in favour of supranational arrangements. Under the re-
gime designed by the treaty, the first duty of each state in the euro zone is to secure 
a balanced budget. This balanced-budget norm is considered so central that it is 
to be set in a binding and permanent domestic law, preferably of a constitutional 
character. In addition, each state must set a medium-term budgetary objective 
(MTBO), which is to provide a realistic budgetary target and a plan to realize it. 
This will be assessed by the EU Council which can “invite” a state to adjust its 
programme if it is unhappy with it. For states that do not have a balanced budget 
– at present, the vast majority of member states – the assessment does not concern 
only their targets, the robustness of their planning and the quality of their reforms, 
but also the broader socio-economic context and the demands placed by this on 
the national governments.
Overall, the treaty and related European legislation introduce a system of “co-
management” by member states and EU institutions – what the Stability Treaty calls 
a “budget and economic partnership” – to control and correct the economic, fiscal, and 
ultimately the welfare policies of euro zone members in serious financial difficulties. 
This process of co-management of the national economies (which some observers 
also call “co-government”) represents an unprecedented interference with national 
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sovereignty, at a moment when popular hostility towards the EU and its institutions 
has reached an intensity never experienced before. The result, according to a well-
known specialist of European law is a system of mixed economic governance where 
“the atrophying of local democracy leads to a hollowing out of domestic processes 
so that these become little more than administrative containers”17.
Although 25 member states have signed the Stability Treaty, the driving force 
behind it has been Germany – a country which the euro crisis has placed in the dif-
ficult and unpleasant role of a reluctant hegemon. It remains to be seen how strictly 
national governments will be willing to enforce such restrictive and unpopular con-
ditions. Recent evidence justifies some doubts. Already at the end of January 2011 
the German chancellor had been working on plans for an “economic government” 
of the euro zone. The first step in the new strategy to further integrate the EU on 
economic issues was to be the “Pact for Competitiveness” – a long term plan intended 
to provide a permanent solution for the ongoing euro crisis.
The Pact would have required all member states of the euro zone to adhere to sound 
fiscal and social policies, including a limit on pensions to reflect demographic devel-
opments, and modest wage increases that would no longer be adapted automatically 
to rising prices. However, biting criticism of the Pact came from across the EU: from 
long-time members of the Union and new member states, small and large countries, 
debt-ridden southern countries and fiscally virtuous northern countries, even from 
the head of the European Commission.
As we know, monetary union was introduced against the advice of the vast 
majority of experts who considered it to be, at best, a premature move. Today it is 
generally admitted that monetary union was a political, not an economic, project: 
among other things, it was supposed to make irreversible the movement towards 
the political union of Europe. In fact, Europe has never been politically as divided 
as at present. In this atmosphere of political dissension, economic crisis, and even 
open revolt, the Stability Treaty foresees a massive transfer of economic, political, 
and social competences from the national to the EU level.
The problem is that in the absence of popular support for such radical changes 
of the governance structure, co-management or co-government between national 
administrations and European institutions could well result in an overall loss of 
effectiveness at national level without compensating gains at EU level. The conse-
quences could be disastrous from both the normative (democratic legitimacy) and 
the economic point of view. Time restrictions allow me to consider only some of 
17 D. Chalmers, The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle, ”European Law 
Journal” 2012, vol. 18, no. 5, p. 693.
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the economic consequences of the loss of policymaking autonomy of the national 
governments.
To begin with, there is the potential loss of what Michael Porter has called the 
competitive advantage of nations – see the citations at the beginning of the present 
paper. According to this well-known management expert and professor at the Harvard 
Business School, neither globalization nor European integration have reduced the 
central role of the national state in economic development and innovation. Porter 
starts from the observation that the leaders in particular industries and segments of 
industries tend to be concentrated in a few nations and sustain competitive advantage 
for many decades. This competitive advantage is created and sustained in a highly 
localized (national or even regional) process:
Differences in national economic structures, values, cultures, institutions, and 
histories contribute profoundly to competitive success… While globalization of 
competition might appear to make the nation less important, instead it seems to make 
it more so. With fewer impediments to trade to shelter uncompetitive domestic 
firms and industries, the home nation takes on growing significance because it is 
the source of the skills and technology that underpin competitive advantage… The 
home base [for successful global competitors] is the nation in which the essential 
competitive advantages of the enterprise are created and sustained. It is where a firm’s 
strategy is set and the core product and process technology (broadly defined) are 
created and maintained18.
These propositions are supported by an impressive amount of statistical and de-
scriptive material showing how a nation provides an environment in which its firms 
in a particular industry are able to improve and innovate faster than foreign rivals. 
The sample includes ten important trading nations-from Japan, Singapore and Korea 
to the United States, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland – and over 100 industries. The 
theoretical core of Porter’s approach is a critique of the static (neo-classic) view of 
competition in which a nation’s factors of production are fixed and firms deploy such 
factors in industries where they will produce the greatest return. In actual competi-
tion, Porter points out, the essential character is innovation and change. “Instead 
of simply maximizing within fixed constraints, the question is how firms can gain 
competitive advantage from changing the constraints”19. In the first section of this 
paper I argued that this was the correct strategy also for governments facing tech-
nological, economic, or political constraints. To expand the range of feasible choice, 
however, both firms and governments must enjoy a considerable freedom of action.
18 M. E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Free Press, New York 1990.
19 Ibidem, p. 21.
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More recent research provides additional support for the thesis that economic 
development is possible only by preserving or even strengthening the policymaking 
autonomy of the national governments. As Dani Rodrik (an economist teaching at 
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government) writes: “Markets are most developed 
and most effective in generating wealth when they are backed by solid governmen-
tal institutions. Markets and states are complements, not substitutes, as simplistic 
economic accounts would have it20. Analysing a huge set of economic data from 
both advanced and developing countries Rodrik found a strong positive correlation 
between a country’s exposure to international trade and the size of its government. 
In other words, “governments had grown the largest in those economies that were 
most exposed to international markets”21.
For example, countries heavily engaged in international trade, like Sweden or the 
Netherlands, devote the highest proportion of their resources to the public sector 
– between 55 and 60 per cent of GDP. How to explain this rather counterintuitive 
finding? Rodrik considers many possible explanations and, in the end, concludes that 
the evidence points strongly toward the social insurance motive: “People demand 
compensation against risk when their economies are more exposed to international 
economic forces; and governments respond by erecting broader safety nets… If you 
want markets to expand, you need governments to do the same”22.
In the decades following the Great Depression of the 1930 s, industrial states have 
erected a wide array of social protections – unemployment compensation and other 
labour markets interventions, health insurance, family support, etc. – that mitigate 
demand for cruder forms of protection such as sheltering the economy behind high 
tariff walls, as was done during the Great Depression. This is the reason why today 
protectionism can be kept under control, in America as in Europe.
The paradox is that while the European Union does not have either the financial 
resources or the legal powers to provide similar compensations against the risks of 
globalization, at the same time it pretends to limit the autonomy of the member states 
by imposing increasingly stringent constraints on national policy making. From the 
very beginning of European integration the emphasis has been on the “harmonization” 
of the laws and policies of the member states rather than on a healthy competition 
between different national approaches to problem solving. As a consequence, inter-
jurisdictional competition has played no role in the integration process. Indeed, a well-
known expert of European law like Stephen Weatherill maintains that competition 
20 D. Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 16.
21 Ibidem, p. 17.
22 Ibidem, p. 18.
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among national regulators is incompatible with the notion of undistorted competition 
in the internal European market. Hence the UK – the member state which has most 
consistently defended the benefits of inter-state competition – has been accused of 
subordinating individual rights and social protection to a free-market philosophy 
incompatible with the basic aspirations of the European Community/Union: “Com-
petition between regulators on this perspective is simply incompatible with the EC’s 
historical mission”23. Widespread opposition to inter-jurisdictional competition 
explains why the principle of mutual recognition has played a much more limited 
role in the integration process than had originally been expected24.
This deep-rooted opposition to inter-state competition has been criticized by 
the Canadian economist André Breton, author of an important book on Competi-
tive Governments. Breton notes that in the EU inter-country competition has been 
virtually suppressed through excessive policy harmonization. Assessing the situation 
before the euro crisis, he writes:
I believe that the European Union is quite stable but that the stability has been 
acquired by the virtual suppression of intercountry competition through excessive 
policy harmonization…. To prevent the occurrence of instability, competition is 
minimized through the excessive harmonization of a substantial fraction of social, 
economic, and other policies… If one compares the degree of harmonization in Eu-
rope with that in Canada, the United States, and other federations, one is impressed 
by the extent to which it is greater in Europe than in the federations”25.
According to Breton, part of the opposition to the idea that governments, 
national and international agencies, or vertical and horizontal networks, should 
compete among themselves derives from the widespread notion that competition 
is incompatible with, even antithetical to, cooperation. He cogently argues that this 
perception is mistaken. Cooperation and competition can and generally do coexist, 
so that the presence of one is no indication of the absence of the other. In particular, 
the observation of cooperation and coordination does not per se disprove that the 
underlying determining force may be competition.
If one thinks of competition not as the state of affairs neoclassical theory calls 
“perfect competition”, but as an activity – à la Schumpeter, Hayek, and other Aus-
trian economists who developed the model of entrepreneurial competition – then it 
becomes plain that “the entrepreneurial innovation that sets the competitive process 
in motion, the imitation that follows, and the Creative Destruction that they generate 
23 S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, p. 180.
24 G. Majone, Europe As The Would-Be World Power: The EU At Fifty, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009, pp. 117–124.
25 A. Breton, Competitive Governments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, pp. 275–276.
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are not inconsistent with cooperative behaviour and the coordination of activities” 
(ibid.: 33). Given the appropriate competitive stimuli, “political entrepreneurs” (in-
novative policymakers), like their business counterparts, will consult with colleagues 
at home and abroad, collaborate with them on certain projects, harmonize various 
activities, and in the extreme case integrate some operations – all actions correspond-
ing to what is generally meant by cooperation and coordination.
Let me conclude. Sixty years is not a long period in the life of a state, or even of 
a major public institution. The European Union is still a young political system and it 
is therefore quite understandable that it should be incomplete in many of its elements, 
and also that it should be prone to mistakes. Moreover, it is a highly composite and 
inhomogeneous system that must satisfy a number of different, sometimes conflict-
ing, demands. If the notion of optimality (“first best”) is hardly applicable to national 
policymaking, as was argued in a previous section, it is almost meaningless in the 
context of EU policymaking.
Feasibility, however, is a necessary condition at all levels of governance – indeed, 
in all types of human activity. A national government may be reluctant to examine 
too closely the feasibility of a pet project, but the political opposition will not miss 
the opportunity to accuse the government of being incompetent. Unfortunately, the 
government-opposition dialectic simply does not exist in the EU. This condition 
should enhances the role of feasibility analysis at the European level. However, the 
absence of any concern about feasibility is one of the most striking, and worrisome, 
feature of European governance. Also worrisome is the near-absence of policy 
evaluation using outcome rather than process criteria. Indeed, the institutions of 
the EU are themselves in a serious crisis. According to Jean-Claude Piris who knows 
those institutions very well, the Commission has become weaker since the 1990s 
for a number of factors, including its composition and pressures from the European 
Parliament (EP) and from the largest member states. In fact, the powers of the EP 
have been expanded treaty after treaty, but the results have not been as positive as 
expected, so that Piris writes of a “relative failure” of the EP--as shown, for instance, 
by the steady decrease of voters’ participation in European elections26.
As a relatively new governance system, the EU is entitled to make mistakes. What 
can be reasonable asked, however, is that after the experience of the euro crisis, the 
strategy of fait accompli – moving ahead, regardless of longer-term consequences 
– should be definitely abandoned. This means that integration should advance 
only to the extent permitted by the prevailing economic, political, and institutional 
26 J.-C. Piris, op.cit., pp. 8–15.
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conditions. It is all too obvious that the decision to proceed with monetary union did 
not satisfy even minimally such conditions. As long as the EU remains a complex, 
incomplete, and unpopular system of governance, it is everybody’s interest to maintain 
the essential autonomy of the national governments and their administrations. The 
strength of Europe, its capacity to meet the challenges of globalization, reside in its 
diversity, not in harmonization; in its competitive governments, not in a super-state 
conceived as a more or less traditional state “writ large”.
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